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Conflict Fragmentation Index 
Abstract: It is widely accepted that fragmentation influences conflict processes in a 
profound way. Multi-party conflicts with several fronts are notoriously hard to resolve. 
However, there is no easily computable measure to approximate conflict fragmentation. In 
this article, we introduce the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI), which is computed by 
adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. The CFI considers the relative prominence of 
each dyadic-level conflict-fronts nested in the entire civil war. The relative prominence is 
approximated by using available information on conflict casualties. The CFI is time-variant 
and highly sensitive to battlefield dynamics. The flexibility of CFI can bring several 
advantages. Most notably, it is possible to calculate monthly or even daily measures of 
conflict fragmentation by taking state-based (government vs NSA) as well as non-state 
based (NSA vs NSA) conflicts into account. Overall, the CFI provides a theoretically-informed 
and easy to compute measure to approximate conflict fragmentation.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the research on civil wars has made a considerable effort to move 
beyond simple conceptualizations of conflict processes as two-party interactions between a 
state and a unitary challenger (Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham, et al., 2009; Pearlman & 
Cunningham, 2012). Disaggregated conflict studies highlighted the complexities arising from 
combatant fragmentation. Several researchers have argued that fragmented conflicts are 
harder to resolve, tend to last longer and are more likely to recur (Cunningham, 2006; 
Cunningham, et al., 2012; Cunningham, 2013; Rudloff & Findley, 2016).  
Although fragmentation has been widely acknowledged as an important component of 
conflict processes, it is a challenge to conceptualize and measure it. Even when we rely on 
multi-dimensional definitions of fragmentation (see Bakke, et al., 2012), disaggregated 
information on constitutive dimensions is rarely available. As a result, the total number of 
actors involved in a conflict is often used as a crude proxy, especially when the interest is to 
control for the effects of fragmentation (e.g. Ruggeri, et al., 2012; Hultman, et al., 2014). 
In this article, we propose an alternative measure, the Conflict Fragmentation Index 
(CFI), which takes the number of causalities in conflict-fronts into account. The CFI is 
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computed by adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which was originally 
proposed to measure the market fragmentation, and has been widely adapted in social 
science ever since, including by the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI). Conceptually, we 
replace the market share of a company in the HHI formula by the proportion of casualties in 
a conflict-front to the total number of casualties in the whole conflict. In practical terms, the 
CFI is easily computable by relying only on the UCDP Data Family (Allansson, et al., 2017). 
The conflict-front is operationalized as the dyadic conflict between Actor A and Actor B, and 
the casualty data can be approximated by using the Battle Related Deaths dataset.  
The remaining of the article briefly discusses ways of conceptualizing conflict 
fragmentation and introduces the CFI.  We present an empirical application by analyzing 
civil conflict duration and highlight the limitations of the CFI in our concluding remarks.  
2 Conceptualizing Conflict Fragmentation 
There are several similar approaches to conceptualize conflict fragmentation. One approach 
focuses on actor splintering as the main component (Findley & Rudloff, 2012; Rudloff & 
Findley, 2016). Under this framework, fragmentation primarily refers to fission; an entity 
disintegrates into some of its components. Splintering is a major source of conflict 
fragmentation as rebel-groups often emerge by breaking apart from another organization. 
However, splintering is not the only source for fragmentation. Multiple entities can emerge 
independently from each other during a conflict process. For example, multiple rebel 
organizations were independently formed in Colombia in the 1960s rather than one 
organization breaking apart from another “original”2 organization.  
Data advances allowed researchers to approximate conflict fragmentation by looking at 
the number of rebel groups and by distinguishing actors emerging through splintering.3 
Nevertheless, the dyadic approach to civil wars, which opens the black-box category of “the 
rebels” to disaggregate NSAs, also uses the “unitary actor” assumption (Pearlman & 
Cunningham, 2012). However, actors are never unitary and they vary in terms of their level 
of coherence. Therefore, the concept of fragmentation, ideally, should also capture the 
internal coherence of actors by looking beyond the number of NSAs and splintering. 
Bakke et al. (2012) propose the most comprehensive conceptualization of 
fragmentation by identifying three dimensions; “(1) the number of organizations in a 
movement; (2) the degree of institutionalization across these organizations; and (3) the 
distribution of power among them”. Bakke et al. (2012) focus primarily on ethno-political 
movements but their approach is transferable to civil conflict processes in general.  
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Although we agree with Bakke et al. (2012) that information on all three dimensions of 
fragmentation is desirable, such information is rarely available. Measuring the degree of 
institutionalization and the distribution of power might not be possible for many cases. 
While the multidimensional approach aims to relax the “unitary actor” assumption by 
looking beyond the concrete entities in a conflict, it might be inevitable to introduce 
alternative assumptions to identify the analysis units. For example, we might require strong 
assumptions defining what constitutes an ethno-political movement, because of multiple 
identities and cross-cutting cleavages.4 
Overall, conceptualizing and measuring conflict fragmentation is not a straightforward 
task. In the next section, we develop an approach to approximate important dimensions of 
conflict fragmentation by using available data.  
3 Building the Conflict Fragmentation Index 
We start with the premise that the distribution of combat activity among conflict-parties is a 
relevant measure to proxy fragmentation. Civil wars may have core actors responsible for 
most of the fighting, and tangential groups that marginally take part in the conflict. The total 
number of actors being equal, a conflict is less fragmented if most of the fighting is 
concentrated between particular actors, compared to conflicts that have the fighting more 
equally dispersed across conflict-parties. Therefore, depending on the concentration of 
combat activity, conflicts with equal number of actors can have different levels of 
fragmentation. To use the fragmentation through splintering as an example, if an NSA 
divides into two equally prominent entities, then fragmentation should increase more than 
a situation in which a relatively small component of the NSA disintegrates to form a new 
entity. 
Based on this conjecture, we propose the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI), which is 
constructed by adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Conceptually, the CFI takes the 
information on the prominence of conflict-fronts into account, and is calculated by the 
following formula;  
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The underlying idea is that, a conflict can have many battlegrounds that their relevance 
varies across cases and time. We can operationalize a conflict-frontline as a dyadic conflict 
between Actor A and Actor B. In this sense, a conflict-frontline does not refer to a 
geographical space but a dyad. To approximate the relative prominence of a conflict-
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frontline, we can use information on the battle related deaths. If the fighting intensity is 
concentrated on a front, then that battle zone is more prominent compared to other fronts. 
Using the CFI to proxy conflict fragmentation brings several advantages. Most 
importantly, the CFI can be easily computed by relying only on the UCDP Data Family. No 
additional information apart from the conflict intensity is needed. Second, the measure is 
time-variant and highly sensitive to changes in the battlefield dynamics. Third, the 
causalities measure allows researchers to consider in-fighting between NSAs as conflict 
fragmentation. For example, it can be argued that a conflict is more fragmented if NSAs 
fight with each other compared to a conflict where fighting takes between government 
forces and NSAs. 
It is possible to replace the battle related deaths in the CFI formula by an alternative 
measure. For example, Butcher (2015) also adapts the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index to 
compute concentration of military capabilities across actors within a conflict. Butcher’s 
(2015) Fractionalization measure plugs-in number of troops instead of battle-related deaths; 
yet, we maintain that causalities in a conflict is the most appropriate measure for conflict 
fragmentation. Causalities capture how the conflict activity is dispersed among actors in a 
dynamic manner. As such, the CFI can account for complexities of conflict behavior of 
multiple actors by requiring minimal information on conflict intensity of dyads.  
Figure 1 illustrates this point. The UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) is used to 
calculate the CFI scores (Croicu & Sundberg, 2017). We first limit GED to two types of 
conflicts; (1) government vs NSA and (2) NSA vs NSA. The GED considers non-state conflicts 
(type 2, according to GED) strictly separate from state-based conflicts (type 1, which 
includes civil wars). However, it can be argued that most NSA vs NSA conflicts are nested in 
state-based conflicts. For such conflicts, if at least one of the NSA is not part of more than 
one state-based conflict, non-state conflict is assumed to be nested in the state-based 
conflict.5 This approach allows us to consider NSA vs NSA fighting as a factor increasing 
conflict fragmentation.  
As shown in the cases of Pakistan and Afghanistan, high numbers of rebel groups do not 
necessarily translate into a high value for the CFI. Pakistan has the highest number of dyads 
nested in a conflict (10) in all of the GED but its CFI is below the median of fragmented 
conflicts. Similarly, Afghanistan has many active fronts but most of the fighting has been 
concentrated between government forces and the Taliban since the mid-2000s. Sudan has 
large fluctuations in the CFI score regardless of conflict intensity whereas Israel-Palestine 
conflict has a consistently large CFI score despite fluctuations in conflict intensity. 
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Figure 1: Black line shows the CFI score and the dotted blue line shows the total number of 
battle deaths. How many dyads are nested in the conflict is superimposed on each CFI score. 
3 Fragmentation and Conflict Duration 
We demonstrate the applicability of the CFI by looking at civil conflict duration. It has been 
widely accepted that fragmented civil wars are harder to resolve because they involve more 
veto players (Cunningham, 2006). Instead of measuring the number of veto players, we will 
plug in the CFI. To get more conservative estimates, we use the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths 
Dataset (Allansson, et al., 2017), which only includes data on state-based “active”6 
conflicts.7 For data on conflict duration, we use the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset 
version 2-2015  (Kreutz, 2010). 
We control for a series of possible 
confounding variables. First, we control for 
the incompatibility; whether the conflict is 
over governmental or territorial control. 
Data on population and GDP p.c. are taken 
from Gleditsch (2002). Incentives to acquire 
access to natural resources can prolong 
conflict. Data on natural resources is taken 
from (Buhaug, et al., 2009). Coups are 
coded following (Thyne, 2015). Data on 
mediation is taken from DeRouen, et al. 
(2011) and Ari (2017). Whether a NSA 
receives support from an external patron or 
not is coded following Cunningham, et al. 
(2009).  
We estimate two Cox Proportional 
Hazard models. Results are presented in 
Table 1. As we report coefficients, a 
negative term indicates a decrease in the 
hazard rate, which implies longer conflicts. 
A positive term, on the other hand, 
indicates alleviation in the hazard rate, 
meaning shorter conflicts. CFI is associated 
with a significant decrease in the hazard 
rate. Therefore, higher the fragmentation, 
longer the conflict. Figure 2 illustrates this 
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pattern. When we plug-in the median value for CFI (approximately 0.4), the estimated 
survival rate is considerably higher compared to no fragmentation.  
 
 
Figure 2: Survival Estimates with different CFI values 
Conclusion: Limitations and Further Research 
Although the CFI provides a theoretically informed way of measuring conflict fragmentation 
by using widely accessible data, it is not a panacea. Most notably, the CFI cannot capture 
the coherence of conflict-parties. This is an important limitation because the actor 
coherence is a central dimension of fragmentation (Bakke, et al., 2012). The CFI implicitly 
makes the unitary-actor assumption by focusing on conflict-dyads. As a result, the CFI can 
measure fragmentation only after it happens. Measuring the coherence of actors and their 
tendency to further fragment would be extremely useful, especially when the interest is to 
make predictions on a conflict process. Understanding the causes of fragmentation, in this 
sense, is a central question (Seymour, et al., 2016).  
Second, the strength of CFI to capture changes in conflict intensity to estimate 
fragmentation in a temporally informed manner can also be a weakness. Since the CFI uses 
information on battle related deaths, it might be vulnerable to fluctuations in the conflict 
intensity patterns. In this sense, the CFI might mistake noise for signal.  The CFI might be 
most vulnerable when the variance of conflict intensity is high.  Moreover, data on 
causalities might have a higher measurement error when a conflict is extremely fragmented. 
For example, UCDP failed to publish data on the Syrian civil war because of its highly 
fragmented nature. Further developing the CFI to incorporate the information on the 
variance of conflict-intensity across time can be beneficial to improve measurements of 
fragmentation. Future studies might prefer to decrease the variance in the CFI by using a 
smoothing function instead of raw calculations. 
Finally, the CFI is undefined when the total number of deaths is 0 in a conflict.8 This is 
not an issue when the sample includes only ongoing conflicts,  but it is problematic if the 
sample is a mix of both conflict and peace periods since the CFI requires casualties to 
measure fragmentation. 
Despite these limitations, the CFI can be more theoretically relevant than alternative 
readily-available measures, such as number of rebel groups. As such, the CFI might provide a 
finer model fit by better approximating the data generation process. The flexibility of CFI 
can bring a lot of advantages. Most notably, it is possible to calculate monthly or even daily 
measures for conflict fragmentation by taking state-based (government vs NSA) as well as 
non-state based (NSA vs NSA) conflicts into account. 
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